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Abstract
Speculation surrounds the JCPOA amonst nearly all of its signatories. This project seeks to
understand how the agreement commonly known as the “Nuclear Deal with Iran” came into
being. The relationship between the US and Iran in recent history requires special attention for
understanding both the difficulty and the significance of reaching the negotiating table. However,
the other members of negotiations also enabled the process as a whole and had unique national
interests driving their participation. Analyzing this context and depth of incentives reveals
political and economic incentives for all seven of the relevant nations. For Iran and 5 of the
world powers, economic growth drives the soft power initiative. However, the unique situation
of US-Iran tension suggests the United States cooperated with the deal for political purposes.
Additionally, the economic need coincides with unique domestic political structures in most of
the relevant nations. This project considers the US-Iranian relationship from the 1950s in the
time of the Shah in Iran up to the 2016 presidential elections in the United States in 2016.
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Executive Summary
With the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015,
the international community demonstrated a persistent commitment to diplomacy with special
implications for nuclear and non-proliferation agreements and the bilateral relationships of those
involved in JCPOA negotiations. Known commonly as the “Iran nuclear deal,” the JCPOA
brings Iran’s nuclear program under the regulation of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) and, from an international standpoint, adds a perceived element of stability to the
currently volatile Middle East region. The deal faced and continues to strain against opposition
from many sides and factions within Iran itself, nations involved in the negotiations, and other
regional actors. However, it also acts as a framework for future nuclear negotiations, proves the
possibilities of mediation, and suggests room for growth in tense bi-lateral relationships such as
that of Iran and the United States. This project assembles the historical and diplomatic context of
the negotiators with the main events of the meetings which resulted in the JCPOA to analyze
what made the landmark agreement possible. Such an analysis requires consideration of all main
actors, but the bi-lateral relationship between the United States and Iran requires additional focus
because of its unique level of tension and subsequent progress in relation to the negotiations.
To form a complete picture of the JCPOA, this project is split into five sections of
explanation and analysis: an introduction, historical context, negotiators, timeline, and outlook.
The methodology of these sections varies slightly but largely consists of contextual analysis with
events as case studies where applicable. Historical context refers to the main events and
ideologies making up US-Iran relations from the mid-20th century when the Shah ruled Iran to
the modern era of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This section provides the necessary background
for understanding the intensity of the US-Iran dynamic, main events that led to the political
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freeze, and begins to suggest the significance of both nations signing any kind of diplomatic
agreement such as the JCPOA. Negotiators refers to the main actors of the diplomatic meetings
and collaboration that resulted in the agreement, with a focus on each corresponding nation’s
motivations for signing a nuclear deal. These motivations generally break down into political and
economic considerations. The timeline outlines significant meetings and events enabling the
JCPOA’s final form, including the early 200’s meetings between Iran and Europe which act as a
foundation of the final deal. Finally, outlook presents the main argument for explaining the
success of the extended negotiations. The main conclusion states that the current generations in
power in Iran and the United States reflect similarly divided political climates which aligned on
the side of international cooperation for this period of negotiation.
Aggregating the context and corresponding diplomacy of the JCPOA agreement and
negotiations offers insight on a significant political shift. Though the US and Iran remain largely
at odds with each other, these elements of the JCPOA suggest an alternative path of international
discussion may be alive in each country. Therefore, the agreement goes beyond its nuclear focus
and extends into both domestic and international politics. This project highlights the new step of
communication to identify the generations and changes that make an agreement such as the
JCPOA possible despite recent history between the main actors. In the long term, these insights
can extend beyond current political regimes into a general trend toward productive interaction. In
some cases, the interaction will likely take the form of direct economic cooperation, though other
bilateral relationships such as that of the United States and Iran are expected to remain limited.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

The recent global nuclear deal with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA), suggests the beginning of serious shifts in inter-state relations. Of
particular interest is the relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States,
a relationship virtually frozen in sanctions and political disagreement since the 1979 Iranian
Revolution. Though the sanctions persist and diplomatic relations remain strained where they
exist at all, this deal marks tangible interaction and cooperation of the two countries, an
extremely rare occurrence in the last 38 years. The US retains significant influence in the Middle
East and North Africa (MENA) region, constituting a major international actor through its arms
sales and diplomatic ties to Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Gulf states, primarily. Since the
revolution, this influence has typically manifested opposite the national interests of Iran,
enforcing the rifts solidified in 1979.
Occasionally, regional conflicts have resulted in the confluence of the states’ national
interests, such as recent developments in the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq. Diplomacy
regarding these matters proved arduous (source this), and it is significant that they played out in
third nations. These instances of confluence act almost as proxy to direct cooperation between
Iran and the US, since they deal with regional conflicts rather than the relationship of the two
countries themselves. This emphasizes the significance of the JCPOA as a positive diplomatic
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progression dealing uniquely with the countries’ direct relationship. A warming of the diplomacy
between the two nations holds the potential to disrupt current balances of power through the
manner that the US works politically and economically with the Middle East region as a whole,
proving this change in communication a significant development.
In order to gauge the likelihood of any such warming and understood how it came to be,
this paper seeks to analyze the JCPOA in light of the negotiations which formed it. These
negotiations consist of both the conversations that ultimately led to the creation of the agreement,
as well as the primary motivations of each major actor involved. To understand the full impact, a
contextual review of the United States-Iranian relationship serves to outline the reasons for the
current tensions, namely the diverging perspectives leading up to and surrounding the Iranian
revolution of 1979. Such a review defines the sources of conflict and tension and provides the
perspective of each nation. These points in turn suggest what may need to change in order for
each state to reconsider its opposition to the other, as well as beginning to define the economic
and political magnitude of any potential warming.
An analysis of the recent negotiations and the events which enabled the dialogue will
highlight, on the Iranian side, an analysis of the political factions within the country and the
motivations behind the political actors seeking increased conversation and change. The
hypothesis is that these motivations include strategic geopolitical actions in response to current
tensions and wars in the Middle East, effectiveness of US and international sanctions on Iran,
and/or political transformations in one or both countries. This last point naturally requires
research into the United States’s political landscape and any significant alterations in its plans
regarding action and its role in MENA.
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With respect to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action itself, which constitutes the bulk
of this analysis, key points include what the talks and agreements mean for each nation,
including the pros and cons of signing onto the deal. This seeks to explain how agreements made
parallel to the deal came to be and whether they would have been possible without the
international collaboration of the JCPOA. Finally, this project seeks to hypothesize whether the
JCPOA does indeed demonstrate the potential for increasing interaction between the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the United States, or whether their participation is negligible in regard to
their inter-state relations and the outlook remains stagnant. The initial hypothesis is that the
agreement is a result of progression in each state’s national interests that can guide the nations
toward greater cooperation, but that further developments will remain sluggish due largely to the
generation of political actors of each country. As these generations see increasing turnover, the
relationship can expect, or at least effectively work toward, greater cooperation. The JCPOA
serves as a sign of this upcoming, though not yet present, full potential.

4
Chapter 2
Historical Context of US-Iran Relations: Relevant events and ideologies from the era of the
Shah to the 1979 Iranian Revolution

The conflicts, tensions, and opinions leading up to and surrounding the 1979 revolution
continue to characterize US-Iran relations today. This revolution marked a drastic change in the
countries’ policies, with Iran quickly changing from one of the US’s greatest allies to one of its
greatest perceived threats. For Iran, the change signified the ultimate independence from foreign
Western influence and a significant step toward true national sovereignty. Prior to Iran’s current
Islamic Republic, Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi led the government as the second, and
ultimately final, figurehead of the Pahlavi dynasty, and he did so with the full support of the
United States for decades. This time marked the height of the US-Iran alliance through the twinpillar policy, where Saudi Arabia and Iran were purportedly defining actors in the US’s planned
alliances. The perceived goal of these alliances was the maintenance of the US’s prominent
influence in the MENA region. From the US perspective, the need arose out of Cold War fears in
the superpower balance with the Soviet Union. As the two largest nations, economically and
geographically, in MENA, these nations presented a strong regional presence which the US
wanted to set up friendly relationships with and use for mutual advantage. For Saudi Arabia and
Iran, the alliance offered assistance in establishing the nations’ own regional power and
influence, enhanced by the technical support of advanced US arms and the political will of the
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superpower. Sanati draws the parallel as US desires toward global hegemony in comparison to
Iran’s search for regional hegemony1.
One interpretation of these benefits is that they were short-lived, and although there was
potential for the US international interest to coincide with the “twin-pillars”’ interests, there was
also room for drastic separation. The global hegemonic goals of the United States clashed with
the regional desires of Saudi Arabia and Iran, causing the powers to oppose and act against each
other. This could stem from feelings of international manipulation, or baser problems of
economy and geopolitics. In this understanding of events, the geopolitical developments in
MENA manifested in the divide between the US and Iran, turning the relationship into an
ideological battle playing out in the entirety of the region. However, Saudi Arabia’s maintenance
of its relationship with the US shows that convergence was also possible.
Some argue that the twin-pillar plan overstates US concern with Saudi Arabia, and that
Iran was the foremost goal of US efforts in forming Middle East alliances 2. Regardless of the
magnitude affiliated with each policy, the importance of establishing Iran as an ally in opposition
to the Soviet Union so overwhelmed US considerations that Iran was able to play the threat of
turning to the Soviets to bend US policy in its own favor. The strongest example of this would be
the Shah’s arms deal which Nixon agreed to, then forced his own government’s compliance in
implementation. One interpretation of this manipulation and the ultimately divergent paths of
Saudi Arabia and Iran’s opinions on how best to address the US suggests that Iran separated its
national interest from the global superpower more successfully because it existed as a stronger

1

Sanati, Reza. “Beyond the domestic picture: the geopolitical factors that have formed
contemporary Iran-US relations.” Global Change, Peace & Security. vol. 26, no. 2. pp. 126.
Taylor & Francis.
2
McGlinchey, Stephen. “Richard Nixon’s Road to Tehran: The Making of the U.S. Arms
Agreement of May 1972.” Diplomatic History. vol. 37, no. 4. pp. 841-860. Oxford Jounrals.
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nation-state than Saudi Arabia 3. The Shah’s ability to confer his importance to Nixon and
solidify the arms deal that defined the relationship directly before the revolution provides one
example of the Iranian state’s ability to operate fully in the face of the superpower counterpart.
Unfortunately for the Shah and the US’s comfortable status quo, arms agreements could
not atone for decreasing political freedom and economic opportunities. Repression and inflation
served as a constant reminder of the Shah’s shortcomings as a statesman, and when compounded
with the public’s perception of the Shah’s increasing “Western” materiality, public frustration
escalated steadily. The Shah’s insufficiencies alienated his public enough to cause mass riots in
1978 and ultimately the revolution in 1979. Multiple divisions of the Iranian population found
cause in the Shah’s repressive policies, economic failures, personal opulence, and the perception
that the West in general, and the United States in particular, acted as the ruler’s puppeteer 4.
Emphasizing the role of the West and the US became a rallying cry of the religious and
traditionalist arms of the revolution as they attempted to consolidate support and power. It was a
particularly effective strategy because it played off pre-existing and deeply rooted sentiments of
nationalism in the face of global power intervention. Iran has a deep history of foreign control
across the political, economic, and military realms of its state. The origins can be traced
conservatively to the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828, when modern-day Iran still identified as
Persia, then consistently followed through the nation’s growth up to 20th century capitulations

3

Ibid.
This report focuses on the relevant perceptions and role of the United States. For more
comprehensive reviews of the tensions, complaints, and events of the Iranian revolution, see
Zaman, M. Q.’s The ulama in contemporary Islam: Custodians of change and Kurzman, C.’s
Structural opportunity and perceived opportunity in social-movement theory: The Iranian
revolution of 1979.
4
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and interventions 5. The prevalence and extent of these interventions, which often clearly served
only the benefits of the invading country, integrated a demeaning tone to international relations
in Iran. It was a global abuse of power and lack of balance that helped to ultimately alienate
Iranians from foreign intervention and aid. These ideas led to the extreme opposition to a US
presence characteristic of the Islamic Republic. Regardless of potential gains from cooperation
with the United States, the revolutionary forces manipulated frustration with Western influence
into an ideological principle of their new government, and acted with corresponding force (i.e.
hostage crisis).
The anti-West and nationalist rhetoric recalled two emotionally-charged (and largely
justified) grievances: historical objections to British control and the more recent and highly
contested overthrow of Prime Minster Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. Equating the US with
Britain brought the former into a legacy of exploitation defined in modern times by oil
concessions. Oil concessions were perhaps the application of the abuse, but the ideological
principles of control in the defiance of Iranian sovereignty truly define the principles that the
traditionalists managed to capitalize. It was an appeal that crossed societal sectors and ultimately
assisted in power consolidation, largely due to the manifestation of the demeaning atmosphere
explained above.
The US had retained a degree of separation from the stigma of Western intervention in its
earlier interactions with Iran in part because of a shared history of defying British control. The
United States stood as an example of an advanced nation that had thrown off foreign influence in
a relatively efficient and successful manner. Perhaps more importantly, that personally achieved
national independence grew into a strategic and respected place within the world order.
5

Mirfendereski, Guive. The Privileged American: the U.S. Capitulations in Iran 1856-1979.
Mazda Publishers, 2014.

8
Therefore, the US could act as a model for Iran in its rebuilding attempts of the 20th century. For
example, Iran welcomed American economic advisors as early as 1911 when the Majles
appointed American William Morgan Shuster as treasurer-general, then again with the advising
of Arthur Millspaugh over Iran’s financial sector 6. Though the American government did not
send the aid directly, they encouraged qualified members of the private sector to assist, and the
Iranians in turn placed these men in position of relative importance in their fledgling
government. The terms ended due to British and Russian interference, which Shuster especially
condemned as gross violations of Iran’s sovereignty. These men, however, showed the initial
respect inherent in US-Iran relations and the potential for the two to build together. In other
words, the United States was meant to be the Western model to defy history, a role the US failed
progressively and completely. This failure was a gradual process with loose origins in the
Second World War. But the defining moment coincides with the traditionalists’ national appeal:
the fall of Mosaddeq.
Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq retains renown as Iran’s foremost precedent of
democracy. He came to power through legitimate needs and is perhaps best well-known for his
work to re-nationalize Iran’s oil industry. In seeking to abolish Britain’s remaining oil
concessions, Mossadeq affirmed his position as an Iranian nationalist truly taking the impetus of
the country’s sovereignty. It was, therefore, particularly notable when in 2013 the CIA public
acknowledged their fundamental role in his overthrow 60 years prior. This acknowledgement
authenticated decades of Iranian claims of American orchestration of the coup, which on the
larger scale, affirmed the US as a hypocritical actor in terms of its relations with Iran. The
American duplicity, largely accepted as fact in Iran prior to the intelligence agency’s admission,

6

Ibid.
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provided an apt example to the traditional revolutionists anti-West/US rhetoric. With these ideas,
the factions of the revolution could have a common enemy and cause against foreign hypocrisy,
as well as justification for their distrust of the international system as a whole. The lack of
repercussions for the global powers allowed the Marxists of Iran to highlight the idea that
“international law was simply one ideological weapon in the bourgeois arsenal of oppression” 7.
Since Iran was already acting on its aforementioned goals of national and regional influence, the
mobilization proved largely effective and the US became the new enemy, with Britain slipping
into the past. This was a particularly impactful change in relations because of the hopes and
close-knit ties of Iran and the US in previous nation-building and supporting initiatives. The
conflicts were ultimately more personal than a general Western evil ideology. The leftist lead in
condemning the attack also helps add context to the cross-sector appeal of the later cry of the
traditionalists.
It was the full impact of the cry against the West that resulted in the hostage crisis amidst
the revolution. When students took hold of the US embassy in Tehran, they had no direct ties to
the religious revolutionaries who were simultaneously cementing their role as the new ruling
elite. However, their use of nationalism and anti-US rhetoric likely added ideological legitimacy
to the takeover and influenced the extended time of the crisis. Additionally, Ali points out that
students, especially those educated in the United States, already moved within a revolutionary
atmosphere and contempt for power. With the United States struggling with Nixon’s Watergate
scandal and the country’s controversial escalation of the Vietnam War, much of the youthful
generation of the United States was feeling a similar contempt to their counterparts in Iran. The
feelings compounded primarily in the 1960’s, also the culmination of frustration with the Shah.
7

Ansari, Ali M. Confronting Iran: the failure of American foreign policy and the next great
crisis in the Middle East. pg. 30. Basic Books: Perseus Book Group, 2006.
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Therefore, the leftist and student-led opposition groups that ultimately participated in the
revolution held many frustrations against governmental abuse of power. This allowed for the
temporary unifying element within the revolutionary factions. Unfortunately, the temporary
nature of the unity had long-lasting effects on the international stage. Misunderstanding and
miscommunication surrounding the Iranian hostage crisis can be seen as representative of the
overarching trend in US-Iran relations since the advent of the Islamic Republic 8. One important
element to note is the difference of perspective between the US and Iran. While the media
outsourced the crisis to the American public and stirred outrage, Iranians debated a sense of
retribution for years of intrusion by foreign nations’ policies. Though ultimately understood as a
wrong, the full impact on the American psyche was undervalued by the Iranians, just as the
Americans underestimated Iranian unrest over their previous transgressions. In this way, the two
nations established a norm of “just missing” each other in their understandings and policy
attempts.
Addition examples of tension and aggravations include the Contra Affair, the missed
opportunity of former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami’s speech before the United
Nations 9, and former US president George W Bush’s inclusion of Iran as part of the “axis of
evil”. Ansari (convincingly) attempts to categorize these miscommunications into international
theory by assessing the similar educational background of the actors in each nation. He argues
that many of the Iranian nationals had received realist-centered educations in the West before
returning to Iran, and therefore expected the United States to act along the principles of realism.

8

For additional information on the hostage crisis, see Farber, D.’s 2009 Taken hostage: The Iran
hostage crisis and America’s first encounter with radical Islam and Brulé, D.J.’s 2005
Explaining and forecasting leaders’ decisions: A poliheuristic analysis of the Iran hostage
rescur decision.
9
Ibid. supra note 7. Chapter 5.
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However, the United States’ response proved reactionary and ideological rather than realist,
especially after the public’s access to the hostage crisis. This outlines a fundamental disconnect
in expectations versus reality from both sides of the relations. With such complex and close-knit
history to this fundamental conflict of understanding as a foundation, most attempts at diplomacy
were brushed aside by the receiving nation. It took time and a “perfect storm” of political actors
at each national level to be able to come to the international agreement that came to be known as
the JCPOA.
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Chapter 3:
Negotiator Motivations: primary actors’ motivations and contributions to JCPOA negotiations

The primary negotiating actors of the JCPOA (excluding Iran) can be described as the
P5+1 and EU or the EU/E3+3. The first description highlights the UN Security Council
affiliation while the second emphasizes the role of the European Union. Regardless of
descriptive form, the countries involved were Russia, China, the United States, France, Britain,
Germany, an EU representative and Iran itself. Germany and the EU participated in the JCPOA
negotiations because of their active role in earlier nuclear diplomacy with Iran prior to the US,
China and Russia becoming fully involved. The group taken as a whole may hide some of the
international dynamics at play. For example, France, Germany, Britain, and the EU
representative naturally held coinciding motivations and intentions because of their common
European identity10.
However, a second dynamic appears between these European countries and the United
States, frequent allies. From the ally partitioning, Iran, Russia, and China form a second side of
negotiations. Though the relationships also contain complex histories, Russia and China align
with Iran on economic and international issues more frequently than the “Western” negotiators.
This is not to say that there was a clear divide between East and West during the negotiations,

10

“Statement by France, Germany, United Kingdom, United States and the High Representative
of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on Post-JCPOA Business with
Iran.” European Union External Action. 19 May 2016.
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but begins to reveal a few of the dynamics and motivations, as well as how the countries may
have aligned on certain points of contention during negotiations due to their pre-existing
alliances. Additional insight can be drawn from a more detailed review of the main negotiating
countries’ actors and motivations for completion of the nuclear deal.

Russia
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov
All of the countries or “powers” involved in the negotiations shared the goal of a
diplomatically settled nuclear deal. However, in Russia there was some debate over the
economic repercussions of such a change in global relations with Iran. Russia’s defense and
private companies, in the energy sector in particular, perceive Iran as potential growth territory 11
12

. Conversely, the level of investment Russia expects to sustain in Iran is not enough to

overcome the negative economic impacts of additional foreign sanctions on non-nuclear actions.
Other countries, primarily in Asia, also maintain economic relations with Iran and prevent a
Russian monopoly on investment opportunities 13. Additionally, similarities between Russian and
Iranian oil product pit the two as export competitors, and Russia benefitted from European and
UN sanctions against Iran’s oil market 14. Therefore, fewer sanctions and a return to oil trade
between Europe and Iran would hurt Russia’s share of the market. Together, these factors result
in a level of ambiguity over the economic returns to the JCPOA in Russia and the need to
consider other motivations for assisting or blocking a deal.
11

Kramer, Andrew. “An Embargo and a Boon.” The New York Times. Feb 16 2012.
Khlopkov, Anton. “JCPOA and Russia’s Interests in the Iranian Nuclear Market.” Moscow
Defense Brief. Apr 2016. CAST
13
Maloney, Suzanne. “Three Reasons Why Russia Won’t Wreck the Iran Nuclear Negotiations.”
The Brookings Institution. Mar 25 2014.
14
Ibid. footnote 1
12

14
Russia’s security and geostrategic concerns push the debate largely onto the side of
cooperation in the agreement. The primary outside view of the JCPOA is that it is a stabilizing, if
temporary, deal. Russia’s proximity to Iran and the recently volatile Middle East, as well as its
own border controversies with Ukraine and the area of Crimea, exacerbate the desire for a
stabilizing force in the region 15. Relative to its neighbors, Iran is a consistent and central figure
in the MENA. Therefore, Russia has good reason to pursue diplomatic and even friendly
relationships with whichever regime is currently in place 16. This is especially true since Iran’s
weapon capabilities extend far enough to reach Russia easily should the relations sour
dramatically, and so limiting that potential to non-nuclear risk holds obvious appeal. Nonproliferation is also generally a tenet of Russia’s international preferences, and so there is little
reason for them to pursue an opposite policy in a neighboring country. Ina addition to the appeal
of regional stability, Russia and Iran share national goals and perspectives for their roles in the
international community and MENA region.
Russia and Iran share a relatively unique appreciation for the other’s reasoning because
of their similar aspirations regarding the world order and complaints of the current balance. Both
seek autonomy and recognition of their power and potential role as an international political
actor. Russia can prove its willingness to contribute constructively by helping to form a
successful diplomatic agreement on the global stage that is the JCPOA negotiations 17. It is a step
toward the status of “power” that the country has sought since the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. The JCPOA negotiations present an opportunity for normalcy and patience in

15

Paulraj, Nansi. “The JCPOA and Changing Dimensions of the Russia-Iran Relations.”
Contemporary Review of the Middle East. vol. 2, no. 1, 2016. pp. 95-110. SAGE.
16
Borshchevskaya, Anna. “Russia’s Cooperation on the Iran Deal is No Favor to Washington.”
The Washington Institute. Jul 7 2016.
17
Ibid.

15
negotiations, a more internationally respected platform than Putin’s reputation of reactionary
history. The importance of Russia’s involvement also pulls from their understanding of Iran. The
two have a relatively rare relationship of begrudging respect between the current regimes, despite
a tenuous history that could topple relations if handled without care 18. Because of this
relationship, it is possible that Iran would not be willing to debate as candidly without Russia’s
presence and understanding, making Russia an essential actor. In fact, the current US President
at the time, Barack Obama, recognized that role, saying “we would have not achieved this
agreement had it not been for Russia’s willingness to stick with us.” 19. Russia can, in turn, use
that need to promote their own image and pull in future world order negotiations.

People’s Republic of China
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Wang Yi
China is the second primary actor with a perceived understanding of, or perhaps
sympathy for, Iran’s positions and negotiating requirements. In fact, there is an argument that
China pushed Russia enough to overcome the latter’s qualms on the economic gains and losses
from an Iranian nuclear agreement 20. This intense desire to see the deal go through likely stems
from perceived Chinese diplomatic and economic gains. As the negotiating power with the least
contentious bilateral relations with Iran, China’s history and existing economic policies suggest
they may be able to expand a cooperative and friendly bilateral relationship, at least within the
limits of United States scrutiny.
18

Trenin, Dmitri. “Russia and Iran: Historic Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership.” Carnegie
Moscow Center. Aug 18 2016
19
Friedman, Thomas L. “Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times.
Jul 14 2015.
20
Baev, Pavel K. “The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal.” The Brookings
Institution. Jul 21 2015.
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Prior to 1997, China contributed the most direct aid to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
However, a change in the Chinese global policy regarding nuclear acquisition became necessary
when they signed the non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and this aid largely stopped 21. For
approximately the last two decades then, China’s view of nuclear power centered on security, a
perspective that continues regarding Iran’s nuclear abilities. This security perspective works
alongside China’s self-defined foreign policy principles, which emphasize sovereignty and nonintervention, and in tandem with adherence to the principles of the UN Charter 22. The security
focus holds special significance for China’s interests in the Middle East because the region holds
strong economic potential for the nation. Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapon, for example,
could incite a military response from Israel, causing extreme conflict for those living in the
MENA and area and economic distress for those invested in it. To prevent such a struggle for
power, China works to create a balance in its relations, avoiding sides in the primary Arab-Israeli
and Sunni-Shia divides which often define the Middle East 23. Such a balance and near-neutrality
poses a maintenance challenge, but the economic incentive is a strong motivation.
Both China and Iran place great value in their history, including past national actions and
foreign interactions 24. Unlike the US and Russia, who (from the Iranian perspective at a
minimum) betrayed Iran in the ousting of Mossadeq and Treaty of Turkmenchay, respectively,
China’s empire lay far enough from Persia that relationships managed to remain trade-based and

21

Scott, Emma. “A Nuclear Deal with Chinese Characteristics: China’s Role in the P5+1 Talks
with Iran.” The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief. vol. 15, no. 14. Jul 17 2015.
22
Aghaie Joobani, Hossein and Nadia Helmy. “China’s Role in the Iran Nuclear Deal:
Perspectives from Mainstream Chinese Media.” Asian Politics & Policy. vol. 8, no. 2. 2016. pp.
382-6.
23
Wuthnow, Joel. “Posing Problems without an Alliance: China-Iran Relations after the Nuclear
Deal.” Strategic Forum. vol. 290. Feb 2016. pp. 1-12. ProQuest.
24
Garver, John. “China and Iran: An Emerging Partnership Post-Sanctions.” Middle East
Institute. Feb 8 2016.

17
cordial rather than territorial 25. This is true more generally in that there is no ugly imperial
history in the MENA region at the hands of the Chinese power. This stable foundation highlights
the unique and valuable nature of Sino-Iranian diplomacy, and led to repeated comments during
JCPOA negotiations that the deal would be impossible without China’s drive and support 26. In
fact, this is true of most, if not all, international policies directed to Iran. With China’s influence
and share of the economy, the nation’s unity on efforts such as sanctions proves essential for
meaningful impact 27. This is true because of China’s position as the second largest economy in
the world and more specifically as Iran’s largest export destination 28.
Potential areas of expanding economic cooperation concentrate in the investment and
security sectors as evidenced by previous actions of the two states. One example of existing
security cooperation is the Chinese navy’s public appearance in Iran’s ports in recent years,
previously considered taboo but now tolerated by the international community 29. Given this preexisting relationship, it is a reasonable jump to consider additional points of security partnership.
The Middle East Institute suggests that this would take the form of defense systems sales since
China specialized select systems to counter US-made weaponry. Security is also a natural SinoIran partnership as opposed to technology at large, where Europe would hold appeal as the most
advanced producers 30. In addition, China temporarily encouraged Iran’s bid to join the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization 31. Though China later rejected the bid, the initial verbal support
suggests a level of willingness to negotiate investment opportunities. These, admittedly slight,
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points of cooperation may also play into China’s larger international strategy of the “One Belt,
One Road” policies. Prior to signing the deal, Iran and China shared proposals under this policy,
which could be expanded and accomplished with greater ease given increased cooperation and
less international scrutiny. Such investments would follow the outlines of “One Belt, One Road,”
and would likely include investment in energy, infrastructure development, and finance. China
has the income flexibility to take on such a role in Iran, in contrast to Russia’s weakened
economy32.
It is also worth noting that international backlash for significant cooperation with Iran is
expected to persist even as the nuclear deal progresses. Despite the JCPOA as a sign that Iran-US
relations possess the potential to improve, it is a small step in the overall tensions of the two
nations. For example, Iran will still face strict US sanctions for human rights violations and
missile actions. Therefore, any country forming new security and business bonds with Iran will
need to balance the economic and stability opportunities with the risk of alienating the United
States. Since the US remains the world’s largest economy, a loss in relations holds greater risk
for most nations than the benefits of working with Iran. One repercussion of this dynamic is that
China will likely feel more comfortable making military arrangements with Iran than Europe
because they have less direct ties to the United States and would be less cautious about
exacerbating US tensions 33. On the other hand, China must also consider the economic fallback
of upsetting the US, and may ultimately limit their expansion into Iran to avoid such a problem 34.
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France
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius
As EU members (at the time of negotiating and signing the JCPOA), the remaining
negotiators (Britain, France, Germany, and the EU representative) largely share motivations for
the nuclear deal. However, France stands out as the hardliner of the negotiations overall, with
stricter requirements and stances than even the United States, notorious for tense bilateral Iranian
relations and predicted to be the staunchest negotiator 35. Evidence of France’s adamancy appears
most strongly in initial talks in 2013. There was a strong push by the United States to sign a deal
with Iran, but France effectively stymied the process, saying it was rushed and too weak to
contain the nuclear threat 36. This hardline stance continued into the final months of negotiations
two years later, as even in March 2015 France warned of the risks when pushing a deal through
to meet a deadline 37. France’s strict diplomacy on this issue stems from its national political
trends and its recent experience with Iran’s nuclear program. With Sarkozy’s selection to the
presidency, France significantly increased its hardline stances internationally and took greater
use of military power in its stances. Despite disagreement on many political debates, Sarkozy’s
successor Hollande largely continues this trend and uses the crackdown approach to maintain
France’s influence in the world order 38. The harsh positions stand in strict contrast to French
policies of the early 2000’s, when the nation opposed the Iraq war and suffered from a weak
reputation on using its force.
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Despite a departure from the diplomacy strategies of the early 2000’s, this was also a
significant time in France’s involvement in Iran’s nuclear development. In 2002-3, France
initiated the European effort to form a nuclear deal with Iran. They garnered British support by
requesting the stoppage of uranium enrichment in the hopes it would bring the United States on
board as well. The French decided to initiate the negotiations after the revelation that Iran
violated previous agreements and lied about its actions by building the Fordow Fuel Enrichment
Plant in secret. Fordow caused immense international backlash, but for France it also acted as a
reminder of 30 years of tensions over Iran’s nuclear program. France, like the US, was an early
investor in Iran’s nuclear program under Reza Shah Pahlavi. This relationship fell apart and
became a violent conflict over investment in Eurodif 39 40. With the discovery of Fordow, France
was reminded of Iranian duplicity over this previous conflict and a deep mistrust grew again.
This presents an additional reason France took such a hardline stance during later negotiations.
Unfortunately, temporary suspension of nuclear activities fell through when hardliner
Ahmadinejad took the Iranian presidency41. However, the strict French guidelines and repeated
returns to the negotiating table also show the nation’s persistence in creating a deal.
Their hardline stance reflects strict adherence to national interests in overall international
diplomacy, but also a deep commitment to the non-proliferation regime and an open economy.
Diplomat and former French director for strategic affairs, security and disarmament (2000-3)
Gérard Araud lists sustaining the non-proliferation regime as one of two primary reasons France
revived nuclear diplomatic relations with Iran in the early 2000s. He argues that Iranian
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acquisition of nuclear weapons would escalate tensions in the MENA region and result in either
an attack by nuclear-enabled Israel or additional proliferation by Iran’s neighboring countries 42.
This would threaten both France’s balance in the world order and stability in the region. France’s
current foreign policy also favors the Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. Existing
arms deals and relationships would be threatened if not destroyed by even more violent conflict
in the Middle East 43. Additionally, the nuclear deal could allow France to pursue a similar
relationship with Iran, or at least the beginning of one. With advantages in the energy and
transport sectors, fewer international sanctions on Iran holds opportunity for France financially 44.
Expanding their balance of diplomacy in the region and exploring these economic options likely
contribute to France’s continued participation in nuclear negotiations and ultimate willingness to
compromise.

Germany
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank Walter-Steinmeier
In its relationship with Iran, Germany largely stands with the international community.
This includes the use of sanctions and condemning Iranian human rights abuses. However,
Germany also seems to attempt a balancing act between this allegiance to the international stance
and exploring economic opportunities 45. Compared to other European nations, Germany has

42

Ibid. supra note 29
Kayali, Laura. “France’s Approach to a Nuclear deal with Iran.” The European Institute. 28
Apr 2015.
44
“Respecting JCPOA vital for France.” Mehr News Agency. 31 Jan 2017.
45
Küntzel, Dr. Matthias. “Germany and a Nuclear Iran.” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs. 1
Mar 2015.
43

22
enjoyed a strong economic relationship with Iran in the past 46. However, the strength peaked
with former heads of state in both countries. Since 2009, Germany has largely reflected the
international community’s decisions and opinions of Iran, shifting the balance to the diplomatic
politics and away from monetary incentives 47. In other words, Germany acts in unison with the
UN and supports the use of sanctions as a response to Iran’s nuclear activities 48.
Despite this context for the most recent negotiations, former policies that favored both
states economically remain recent enough that Germany was able to act as a go-between for Iran
and the other European nations. Germany’s overall relationship with Iran since the revolution in
1979 proved positive enough to maintain a level of trust between the two nations. This is
especially obvious since Germany’s Economy Minister was the first European power to fly to
Tehran and begin talks of sanction relief and new joint business ventures after the deal was
signed 49. Without an European nation with decent bilateral relations with Iran, it is possible the
East-West divide of the world powers would have been insurmountable. Instead, Germany’s
recent allegiance to the international standards balanced effectively with its economic
cooperation with Iran and allowed the nation to take part effectively and productively in the
negotiations. This was an especially significant development for Germany since it is not a
permanent member of the security council of the United Nations.
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United Kingdom
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Philip
Hammond
The United Kingdom’s relationship regarding Iran and nuclear negotiations with the
country can be summed into three main areas: past imperialism, large EU economy 50, and United
States’ ally. In some ways, Iran-UK bilateral relations are marred with a past similar to the of
Iran with the United States and Russia. Prior to the era of the Shah, Iran felt misguided and
abused by the imperial powers of Russia and Britain. Ever since, relations have been strained,
with diplomacy halted and embassies removed periodically. This sets a foundation of mistrust
and disillusionment for all present opportunities for cooperation.
As an EU member, and a significant portion of the EU’s economy, the UK does have
financial interest in a more collaborative relationship with Iran. These interests overlap with
EU’s general motivation to seal a nuclear deal, and circulate primarily around the lessening of
international sanctions. The UK promotes active participation and competition in the global
economy, and so the large consumer market and desire for foreign direct investment (FDI) in
Iran offer a prominent new venture area 51. Additionally, Iran is the Middle East’s second largest
economy after Saudi Arabia despite current sanctions. These economic elements poise Iran for
vast economic growth with a freer market. The UK would capitalize on this potential in the
sectors of infrastructure, healthcare, retail, airports and aviation, mining, and water 52.
From a political standpoint and the more vocalized motivation, the UK’s relationship
with the US and a corresponding emphasis on safety is more prominent than national economic
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gains. This can be seen in France’s political strategy in early 2000’s negotiations and more recent
rhetoric from the UK’s prime minister and ambassador to the UN. In the 2002-3 negotiations,
France targeted British safety concerns when forming its hardline stances because British support
had a high potential for bringing the United States on board with the diplomacy as well 53. United
States’ support was essential for a lasting agreement because it has especially tense bilateral
relations with Iran, as explained above. This makes the US more likely to impose secondary
sanctions that would hurt third nations trading with Iran. The close partnership between the UK
and US make the two a natural pair in negotiations, and the EU used its economic ties to the UK
to help garner political support in the US. This process is reflected again in more recent
negotiations with UK figureheads references to safety, not money.
In his supporting statements of the JCPOA, UK Ambassador to the UN Mission Matthew
Rycroft emphasizes the significance of the deal in relation to MENA regional stability. He
presents the nuclear agreement as a stabilizing factor for proliferation and a starting point for
future negotiations on other regional concerns such as migration and narcotics 54. Prime Minister
David Cameron emphasizes similar points in an interview with NBC, when he emphatically
states that the most likely alternative to the JCPOA is Iran’s quick acquisition of a nuclear
weapon. Cameron emphasizes the regional balances this kind of weaponry would exacerbate and
reiterates that the non-proliferation agreement operates along safety standards and validation
checks, as opposed to trust mechanisms 55. These rhetorical supports for the Iran nuclear deal
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closely mirror US concerns over safety standards and other violent conflicts in the MENA
region, suggesting that US and UK political motivations for peaceful nuclear negotiations with
Iran are the closest of the main negotiating partners.

Europe/European Union
Head Delegate to Negotiations: EU High Representative Federica Mogherini
[Early negotiations: former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton]
In addition to a general stance of non-proliferation, Europe used the JCPOA negotiations
as a chance to demonstrate the region’s ability to work as one unified political entity. The
opportunity was especially appealing because of the tense political climate, varied previous
national interactions with Iran post-revolution, and the potentially extended timeframe that the
diplomacy would require. The platitude “high risk, high reward” reflects the overall nature of the
decision to make a European attempt at leading the negotiations. Since the EU’s ability to
function as one is often doubted on the international stage, the high-risk topic of a nuclear Iran
offered a chance to prove their political power as a Union.
Europe initiated significant dialogue on Iran’s nuclear proliferation in the 1990’s. When
it became clear in 2002 that Iran’s actions were duplicitous, the EU made a second major push
for diplomacy. These were the negotiations that culminated in the Tehran Declaration 56 57. In this
push for diplomacy and soft power instead of strong-arming, Europe aimed to demonstrate its
own negotiation abilities and keep the repercussions for Iran’s nuclear activities away from the
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UN Security Council, where the US might force a reactionary or violent response 58. However,
the EU’s efforts in this regard ultimately saw little success as Iran violated the agreement within
the year. When Ahmadinejad came into the Iranian presidency, the hopes for Europe’s progress
on the negotiations virtually disappeared.
In addition to an attempt to assert their soft-power prowess, the EU holds economic
motivations for keeping the international reaction to Iran calm and open. In the early 2000s,
Europe was Iran’s largest source of imports at 37% 59. Therefore, Europe faces business losses
whenever the international community enforces sanctions on Iran. They were politically forced
to comply with nuclear sanctions during the Ahmadinejad presidency, but the JCPOA
negotiations offered a point of re-opening and progress that would allow a return to investment.
Common business interests between the EU and Iran include energy, transportation, and agrobusiness. The EU also prefers to have the option to import Iranian oil when tensions rise with
Russia. Using these business opportunities, it seems that Europe maintains a soft power
approach 60. When dialogue began after Implementation Day, topics went beyond the expected
economic spheres and into areas such as human rights and civil protection 61. This shows
Europe’s continued effort to use dialogue to fight instability and danger, an adherence to a soft
power stance. The approach is summed up by the EU High Representative as “a dialogue of the 4
C’s: comprehensive, cooperative, critical if needed, constructive always. 62”
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United States
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Secretary of State John Kerry
[Early negotiations: Undersecretary for Political Affairs Wendy B. Sherman]
Support for the JCPOA in the United States continues to be controversial, with domestic
political allegiances factoring heavily into individual’s considerations. In the Obama
administration’s efforts to unify the national position on the issue, safety and security rhetoric
prevailed as the factors necessitating diplomacy. Negotiators and supporters emphasized the
realistic benefits of the deal and lack of reliable alternatives. They also stressed the significance
of the world power coordination in the overall agreement and length of negotiating process. In
contrast to other nations, economic considerations took a lesser role, with the finance ministry’s
involvement serving as expertise on the sanctions regime rather than assessing potential for
forthcoming business opportunities if a deal were to be signed 63.
The primary refrain, and consequently primary motivator, of the United States during the
JCPOA dialogue was the importance and goal that Iran not obtain a nuclear weapon 64 65. This
included details on the four pathways to a bomb and constant reminders of Iran’s nuclear
abilities up to that point 66. The non-proliferation focus included mention of the NPT, but greater
emphasis appeared in relation to regional stability. However, while other countries kept this
notion fairly broad, perhaps mentioning Israel or violent conflicts but not their own national
interest, the US adamantly listed support of their allies under reasons to support the political
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dialogue with Iran. Their argument was that a regulatory agreement that limited current nuclear
capabilities and installed IAEA mechanisms for the foreseeable future protected Israel and the
Gulf states from the looming threat that was a nuclear Iran 67 68. This is a significantly less
friendly stance than many of the other P5+1 contributors, and yet still faced backlash nationally.
Hardliners maintained a stance that negotiations were rushed, completed for time rather
than the necessary precautions that would restrict or even remove Iran’s nuclear capacity. An
important counter to that stance, which reinforces the ideas of safety and security, was the power
and repercussions of the world powers agreeing on the deal. After a year and a half of dialogue,
the United States would be the only nation to step away from the agreement if they so chose.
This would be an isolating action for all international policy moving forward, but also undermine
the work of the sanctions regime 69. Some considered continued and more severe sanctions an
alternative to the soft power communication, but those involved insisted that sanctions motivated
Iran to the negotiating table, they served their purpose on the nuclear topic. Therefore, the US
found two primary motivations as the talks progressed: the ally-focused safety they spoke about
before the process and international cohesion which they realized midway.
Some speculation remains about former president Barack Obama’s underlying
motivators. Since the US-Iran cooperation on the JCPOA marks such a rastic change in bilateral
relations, even those that take place within a multilateral framework, questions persist about
whether Obama had long-term goals attached to the JCPOA beginnings 70. Namely, whether the
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far-reaching plan of the Uninted States was to warm relations with Iran, lessening the sense of
enemy so that commong ground and more intense cooperation would be enabled in the future.
The long-term outlook is certainly a possibility. Obama was nearly one generation removed from
the Iranian Revolution, and may not have felt the underlying mistrust as strongly as his
predecessors. Just as the United Kingdom and Europeans suggest working outward from the
nuclear topic into other human rights violations and concerns, coering one topic at a time, the
United States coulf be considering a very gradual change in approach to its relationship with
Iran. Enabling economic growth in Iran and attributing that progress to Rouhani would also
theoretically promote the Reformist political movement in Iran’s domestic politics. This would
encourage future cooperation with the West 71. If the Obama administration is thinking and acting
according to long-term consdierations, future cooperation would be a third cause of US support
for the JCPOA, one masked by the rhetoric of stability, safety and security needed to keep
hardline US politicians satisfied.

Iran
Head Delegate to Negotiations: Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif
Iran’s participation and cooperation in the JCPOA negotiations depended on the nation’s
cost-benefit analysis of nuclear sovereignty and economic mobility72. It was a balance between
hardliners in the government and IRGC who opposed international cooperation and moderate
elements who saw a need for sanction relief and considered the nuclear problem the best option
for the problem. While the former place extensive value in the ideological opposition to the
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West, the United States in particular, their rhetorical hardlining was increasingly jeopardized by
the effect of sanctions on the overall economy 73. Ayatollah Khamenei’s rhetoric maintained the
strict anti-West stance even after the deal was signed, but he also approved the deal as he spoke
against its limitations 74. The contradiction grew from a recognition of need, an argument
perpetuated and encouraged by President Rouhani.
In his support of negotiations and the finalized deal, Rouhani often focuses on the
repressed oil sector and overall depression of the economy resulting from international sanctions.
In the 2000’s, the international community increased their sanctions against Iran with each
additional nuclear discovery75. Even Iran’s typical allies and oil export destinations limited their
intake and communication. When this international economic squeezing compounded with
plummeting oil prices, Rouhani pushed enough emphasis behind the need to receive Khamenei’s
approval for dialogue 76. For added safety and concern, Rouhani supplemented the discussions
with the international threat of war against Iran 77. This economic motivation coincides with the
public’s idea of the worth of the JCPOA, as they expected and hoped for better access to foreign
medication and equipment, an increase in investment, decrease in unemployment, and higher
living standards as a result of the lowered sanctions which the international community conceded
with the JCPOA 78.
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However, underlying political strategy is also relevant in Iran. If Ayatollah Khamenei is a
proxy for the tradionalist and hardliner elite and President Rouhani is his moderate counterpart of
a younger time, both took a gamble on the JCPOA in the hopes of stabilizing their political
ideologies and actions. Both politicians saw potential benefit in a stronger economy. For
Khamenei, economic growth would stabilize his position and ensure that retained Guardian
Council support. If the country’s economy can grow while he continues his anti-West rhetoric,
there is no need for a change. Rouhani, on the other hand, wanted to demonstrate how much
potential increased world cooperation and sanction relief could affect. As a the moderater of the
deal and driving force behind Foreign Minister Zarif’s negotiating tactics, his campaign for reelection would be supported by the improved economy. Perhaps the public would see him as a
positive change and offer the reform ideas more support, instead of limiting their view to the
status quo. Therefore, Iran’s national motivations for entering the deal depended on economic
incentives. However, the economic incentives also drove individual’s poltical aspirations.
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Chapter 4:
Meeting Progression 79

Tehran Declaration
The Tehran Declaration was the 2003 culmination and temporarily successful result of the
European powers nuclear negotians with Iran. It followed the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear
facilities in Natanz and Arak, a revelation provoked by the National Council on Resistance on
Iran, an Iranian opposition group. France and the European Union’s JCPOA motivations above
outline the basic elements and progressions of the negotiations which followed from the
announcement. Iran was likely motivated to participate because of IAEA and United Nations
resolutions condemning their actions.
The main consequence of the agreement was that Iran would suspend its uraniumenrichment activities. This was a departure from Europe’s initial goal of eliminating all
enrighment rather than simply suspending it, but marked significant improvement in overall
regulations. The deal was signed in October, but broken by June of the following year when the
IAEA reported violations and a lack of cooperation by Iran. Negotiations were meant to continue
to try to reconcile the differences, but subsequent election of former President Ahmadinejad
effectively negated this progress. In 2004 and 2005 the violations escalated, with the UN
Security Council finally stepping in. The entire project of diplomacy was marred by the back-and
79
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forth nature of the agreements. Negotiations were disjointed until approximately 2012, but the
P5+1 began to collaborate almost immediately, offering proposals for constructive means of
cooperation.

JPOA
The JPOA was signed in November 2013 after the initial positive negotiations of the P5+1 and
Iran. Productive meeting began in April 2012 and were gradual. Rouhani’s June 2013 election
arrived with promises of increased transparency, giving the efforts motivation to continue in the
meantime. Overall, the JPOA marked the progress made so far, main points and goals of each
side of the negotiations, and stood as political representation of progress with a promise for
additional cooperation to finalize the details of a full agreement. The document resembles the
final JCPOA agreement, but lacks the descriptive detail and step-by-step processes that make the
comprehensive deal unique.
The JPOA operated along a six-month first phase for Iran to begin scaling down its
uranium and nuclear activities as a further sign of support for the dialogue and potential for
continued progress despite the lengthy nature of the negotiations. Implementation truly begain in
January of 2014 with IAEA support and monitoring. The organized implementation process and
signing of this interim agreement acted as a calming measure for the negotiations. It was an
international symbol of progress and continued effort as well as an appeal to outside leaders and
actors showing that the conversations were worthwhile and worth continuing. Since the
negotiations took place over such an extended period and had such a vast history of violation and
disruption, this partial agreement aimed to counteract any fears or misgivings mounting with the
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passing of time. It also set up the Framework for Cooperation Agreement which initiated IAEA’s
full return to Iran.

JCPOA
The JCPOA is the finalized agreement between the P5+1 and Iran. It operates along a 20 year
framework, sets limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment and centrifuge and heavy water
production, effectively extending Iran’s breakout time and transforming the nuclear sector into a
peaceful and energy-focused body. The agreement was signed in July 2015, but implementation
was gradual and included affirmation by the Iran and US national governments. The following
mark the primary developments and are interspersed with IAEA reports tracking Iran’s
adherence to coinciding agrements and the JPOA:
-February 2014: The seven negotiating nations agree on a framework and schedule for
negotiating the final, “comprehensive” deal
-May 2014: comprehensive agreement drafting begins
-Novemer 2014: an extension is required, moving the political agreement goal to March and
technical annexes to the end of June
-14 July 2014: Finalization Day, this means the deal is announced approximately two weeks after
the deadline and inspite of French concerns over rushed final details
-20 July 2014: the UN Security Council endorses the deal and proposals for lifting UN sanctions
-September 2014: oppositionists in US Congress fail to garner enough support to block the deal
-October 2014: Iranian lawmakers approve the deal, leading to the Guardian Councils
ratification. Formal adoption (Adoption Day) occurs on the 18th.
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-16 January 2015: Implementation Day, this means that the IAEA verified Iran met its denuclearization commitments and EU and UN sanctions officially lift

From this point on, the provisions are to be continued and reviewd by the IAEA. Two remaining
dates will occur if the process is implemented on all actors’ parts:
-20 October 2023: Transition Day, this day will matk the permanent lifting of all thus-far
provisionally-lifted sanctions and Iran will begin the process of ratifying the Additional Protocol
-20 October 2025: UNSCR Termination Day, this day will mark the United Nations decision to
close the case on Iran’s nuclear program, essentially resolving the issue as within international
norms and standards

Beyond these two days, the agreement sets up general monitoring procedures that transition into
the longest-term accomplishment: the Additional Protocol.
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Chapter 5:
Conclusions & Moving Forward

After splitting motivations for a nuclear deal with Iran into the national interests of each
primary negotiating nation-state, it becomes clear that incentives flow from political and
economic foundations. Political can be further divided into international community reputations
and MENA region stability. The former of these political motivations refers most significantly to
Iran, Russia, China, Germany, and the EU. The remaining actors, the United States and United
Kingdom, enjoy a safer position in the existing world order, and so their political standpoint on a
nuclear Iran revolves more strongly around the latter incentive, MENA regional stability.
However, all actors cite regional stability in their support of the JCPOA deal as an international
accomplishment.
Regional stability considerations frequently occur in tandem with declarations of
allegiance to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and, in some cases,
global nuclear disarmament. When brought into the context of MENA and current violent
conflicts, frequent references include the safety of the Israeli state, human rights violations in
general, migration concerns, and the violent conflicts in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. When dealing
with Iran, the international community is especially concerned that a nuclear acquisition would
incite a military response from already nuclear-armed Israel, or that it would add extreme
measures of military support to oppressive regimes in Iran and Syria because of the Islamic
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State’s political alliances. Others fear nuclear capabilities reaching Hezbollah, heavily present in
Lebanon, supported by Iran, but considered a terrorist organization by international standards.
These regional concerns form the basis of many arguments brought up against the
JCPOA, but the agreement attempts to standardize and add a safety-structured monitoring
element to the Iranian nuclear program. Given the existing rate of nuclear development, most of
the primary actors cite the JCPOA as the safest and most realistic alternative to Iran’s nuclear
weapon acquisition. For this reason, the agreement is largely considered a stabilizing factor, as it
brings in new regulations and IAEA review systems and adds nuclear activity restrictions that
significantly extend Iran’s breakout timeline. The overall concern for safety enumerated by the
world powers repeatedly in press statements during and after the negotiations suggest a
prominent concern for international well-being. However, when economic considerations are
compared to the safety-rhetoric, national interests prevail as the true motivations.
All members of the P5+1 excluding the United States enjoy recent or current economic
relations with Iran that are restricted by international sanctions against Iran’s human rights
violations, missile activity, and nuclear program. Recent UN sanctions in particular focus on the
nuclear developments, and so all countries subject to the UN Charter face business limitations.
With a large population, space for foreign investment, weak infrastructure, consistent oil sector,
and projected economic growth, business investment in Iran offers many paths for expansion.
Russian, Chinese, and European finance administrations began to explore these possibilities as
soon as possible after the JCPOA signing. Though some conversations coincided with regional
safety and humanitarian concerns, economic opportunities dominated the main points of
dialogue. With these actions and considerations in mind, the concern for international safety
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argument loses potency. Regional stability still matters to foreign actors, but national economic
interests and growth potentials constitute the true motivation for that stability and safety concern.
One possible exception to this underlying economic drive is the United States. Though
private companies based in the US look forward to the opening Iranian market as sanctions
slowly decrease, as evidenced by the Boeing contracts pending official government approval, the
national stance demonstrates a lesser focus on finances and continuously circles back to safety
rhetoric. The safety and NPT focus with a constant reiteration of assessment standards based on
review not trust by JCPOA-supporters reflects the atmosphere of distrust that continues to
underlie and taint all interaction between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran. The
events leading up to and embodying the 1979 Islamic Revolution continue to impact the
country’s perceptions of each other, particularly among conservative hardliners, as outlined in
Chapter 2 above. This prevents full realization of bilateral economic potential and puts dialogue
into a refrain of safety concerns.
The national dynamics of reformist ideology and conservative hardline stances play a
prominent role in the motivations and considerations of Iran and the United States, in particular.
The ability to sustain dialogue across a multi-year span and amidst additional international
disagreements shows a shift in balance in the dynamics of both countries. One example of the
change in the United States political sphere can be seen by comparing the JCPOA negotiations to
the Tehran Declaration attempts. In the early 2000’s, Europe found it wise to garner US support
through soft power means because they feared a reactionary and violent response if the UN
Security Council, where the United States holds veto power and significant influence, took
control of the Fordow revelation response. The European fears stemmed from US political and
military decisions under recent administrations, such as President George W. Bush’s entrance
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into war in Iraq and overall inauguration of the War on Terror. Strict and military actions from
hardline stances predominated the US action on the world stage in general and MENA region in
particular. Combining this trend with the historical tensions perpetuating a freeze of US-Iran
relations created a dynamic too risky to have the US forming responses to Iran. However, the
Obama administration created a new international dynamic for the United
States, working with hardliners to reinforce ideas of safety in relation to Iran while also
exploring diplomatic options that allowed the JCPOA.
In Iran, the change of presidencies also reflects the balancing acts of traditionalist and
reform ideologies. When Europe initiated diplomacy in the early 2000’s gradual, though
inconsistent, progress prevailed until the election of former Iranian president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. At that point, all dialogue and cooperation ceased until his successor, current
President Hassan Rouhani, stepped into the role. Rouhani represents the Reformist movement in
Iran and an overall recognition of the importance of international participation. In the latter
perspective, he reflects former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s recognition of Iran’s
potential gains from cooperation on the world stage. President Rouhani enabled increased
dialogue with his reformist rhetoric nationally and globally in his UN speeches, demonstrating
that Iran’s government included rational actors willing to negotiate for its country’s best
interests.
The changing dynamics in these countries therefore coincided in the mid-2010’s in a
spirit of reform and recognition of the role of international diplomacy. The other P5+1 members
supported and recognized these trends and the roles they could play nationally to enact a nuclear
deal. The dynamics in their own governments show a variation in hardline (France) and
sovereignty-oriented (China) stances, but the group as a whole focused on the potentials and soft
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power opportunity to add stability and economic potential on the global market. The unique
combination of actors in all parties, then, enabled the JCPOA signing.
Additional research is necessary to assess the validity of conclusions drawn here
regarding reform actors and economic motivations taking primacy over political incentives.
Motivations in particular offer an opportunity for further investigation. To weigh the relative
effects of political/humanitarian and economic determinants, future research should review the
meetings of P5+1 members and Iran since the signing and implementation of the JCPOA. To the
extent available, the focus of this additional investigation should be the primary topics of
subsequent dialogue. Categorizing the interactions according to the titles and national roles of the
diplomatic leaders participating in the dialogue against the publicized reports on main discussion
topics would provide additional insight into the true nature of JCPOA motivation.
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